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Inthis paper we investigate the nature and properties of the joint
demand for health insurance and preventive medicine. Our
decision-maker is a globally risk-averse person whose welfare
depends on his consumption and health. The decision horizon
spans two periods, the present and the future. Present income and
health are assumed to be given, but future income is uncertain
because it depends on an uncertain future state of health. We
suppose that the individual can manage this uncertainty in two
This paper represents an amalgamation of two earlier papers: "AModelof Demand for
Preventive Medicine under Uncertainty," by Nordquist, and "The Consumer's Demand for
Medical Goods and Services," by Wu. We wish to thank the conference participants, and
especially R. Berg, M. Grossman, and S. Rosen, for many helpful comments. Notes 1, 4, and 7
have been added in partial response. We are indebted to our colleagues, M. Baich, J. Jeffers, and
J. Heckman, for their help on earlier drafts. Of course, we alone assume responsibility for any
shortcomings that may remain.
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ways:(1) by purchasing an insurance policy that promises benefits dependent
(money payoffs) contingent on his future state of health, and (2) by pected utili
choosing a bundle of medical goods and services called preventive E * —
medicinethat promises to influence his future health prospect.
U
—j
Preventive medicine, unlike ordinary consumption, has little or no where u"
direct effect on utility; its value arises mostly from the beneficial these expe
changes it produces in the consumer's health prospect. We recog- h depend
nize, however, that many ordinary consumer goods play a dual role: alternative
They not only yield utility directly, but also influence the health lengthy de
prospect. Although the main portion of this paper is devoted to restrict ot
what might be appropriately called "the pure aspects of insurance Morgenstei
and prevention," the effect of including goods that play a dual role Now let
is examined in a separate section. Regardless of these variations, health insu
our basic premise is that the consumer will choose present outlays premium,
on health insurance and preventive medicine so as to maximize let p1, 0
expected utility.' The differe
Notice that insurance and prevention are alternative but funda- as employe
mentally different, approaches to planning for future health and C1, depend
welfare. Barring moral hazard of one kind or another, health health insui
insurance permits a person to alter the payoffs of a random
— — experimentin which poor health is a possibility without affecting ' '
its probability. More specifically, the market insurance enables the Future
cOnsumer to redistribute his wealth from the present to the more of health in
hazardous, uncertain future. Prevention, on the other hand, alters Both Y2 and
the prospect for future health without changing the payoffs (except are therefoi
inasmuch as prevention may not be a free good).2 c (h) =y(I In an uncertain setting there are two ways to characterize the
2 2
individual's preferences for present and future consumption. First, , Ofcourse, t
we might suppose that they are essentially unaffected by his state of In the fol,
health, in which case we characterize the individual's expected identically
utility in the framework of von Neumann-Morgenstern. Symboli- presents liti
cally, our problet
upon reflec
Eu =Ju(C1,c2)dF(h;) they both
where u is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index; C1 and
' insurancec
respectively, are the levels of present and future consumption; h€ cies. Thed
(0,1) is the state of health; and F is the probability distribution , eyto e
function of h. Alternatively, we might insist that health has a ro
conditional influence on consumer preferences—that the health simiiar so tu
state should really be an explicit argument in the utility function. In our solutior
this case we describe the individual's expected utility in the Formally
framework of what some have characterized as conditional ex- (1) Maximize
pected utility and Fishburn, 1974) and others, as the state- i,z
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conditional ex-
iers, as the state-
dependent approach to expected utility (Arrow, 1973). This ex-
pected utility is symbolically represented by
Eu* =f u*(Ci,c2,h)dF(h;)
where u" is a state-dependent utility index. Notice that in both of
these expected utility formulations the probability distributions of
h depend on various parameters. The analyses based on these
alternative approaches are somewhat different and both require
lengthy developments. Owing to limitation of space, we will
restrict our analysis in this paper to the von Neumann-
Morgenstern formulation.3
Now let us turn our attention to the constraints. First, define a
health insurance policy by the pair [I,x(h)I], where 1 is the stated
premium, and x(h)I is the total future payoff or benefit. Moreover,
let p1, 0p1, be the private cost of insurance to the individual.
The difference (1 —p)Iis the contribution of some third party such
as employer or government. The consumer's present consumption,
C1, depends on his current income, Y1, and current outlays for
health insurance, p1, preventive medicine, Z, and saving, S; i.e.,
c1=yI—p1--z—s
Futureconsumption, c2,dependson future income, y2; a schedule
of health insurance payoffs, x; and the gross yield on savings, rS.
Both Y2andx are functions of the future random health state h and
are therefore uncertain;4 hence,
c2(h) =y2(h) +x(h)I +rS
Of course, the gross yield on savings may also be taken as random.
In the following development, we suppose that ordinary saving is
identically equal to zero. Although the formal inclusion of saving
presents little difficulty in either the specification or the solution of
our problem, it does complicate the presentation. Furthermore,
upon reflection one sees that saving and insurance are alike in that
they both involve an intertemporal redistribution of income—
insurance can be regarded as saving for specific future contingen-
cies. The difference, of course, is that the yield on savings is not
likely to be closely related to the state of health. In any case, we feel
that the roles played by insurance and saving are sufficiently
similar so that the exclusion of saving does not significantly weaken
our solution.
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(3) c2=y2(h) +x(h)I
where u is a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index. We assume
that the utility function possesses continuous first-, second-, and
third-order derivatives.
We think that this model is of interest not only because of its
bearing on the demand for health insurance and medical services
but also because it represents a generalization of recent literature
on the question of the optimal saving decision under uncertainty.
Leland (1966) has analyzed precautionary saving when future in-
come is uncertain. Sandmo (1969) has examined the case wherein
the yield on saving is uncertain. In our model not only are both
future income and the return on saving (or to be exact, the payoff
from insurance) taken as random but we also permit the consumer
to influence the distribution function of the random variable.5
This paper is divided into five sections. Section 2 introduces and
defines three important concepts in our study. Section 3 develops
the basic model in which the distribution of future health is
assuiped to depend on (1) the consumer's present outlay for
prevention, and (2) an exogenous index of the future health envi-
ronment. Section 4 extends the analysis to the case in which the
distribution also depends on present consumption. Finally, in
Section 5 we summarize our findings and suggest some policy
implications. The proofs of various propositions have been placed
in the Appendix to relieve the text of any cumbersomeness.
2.THREE RELEVANT CONCEPTS
In recent years there have been rather rapid advancements in
theoretical concepts dealing with problems related to the
economics of uncertainty. The concepts of stochastic dominance,
risk aversion, and moral hazard play important roles in this paper. A
brief specification of each of these concepts follows.
StochasticDominance
Stochasticdominance is a set of rules for ordering risky prospects
(Hadar and Russell, 1971). Since we are dealing with a risk-averse
consumer, it is appropriate to assume that prospects are ordered by
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Definition 1.LetF(O) andG(O) be two distinct probability distributions
ofthe random variable 0,where0€(0,1).Then if and only if
f G(0)dO F(0)dO, for all h€ (0,1)
Now letF(0,x) be the distribution function of the random variable
0, where x is a vector of shift parameters. (F(9,x°) is a given prospect
of 0.) Assume that F, andexist for all x, and Xjandthat they are
continuous. Let h denote the health index, where he (0,1).
Definition 2.Let
R(h,x) =fh
[1 —R(h,x)]is the measure of the stochastic size of a given health
prospect.
Notice that definitions 1 and 2 imply that as F becomes larger, its
size becomes smaller, and vice versa.
• Definition 3.A factor (parameter) x, is said to be beneficial (harmful) to
the consumer's health prospect if
R1=fF1do<o>o)
If a factorx1 is beneficial to the consumer's health prospect, it is also
plausible to assume that it exhibits diminishing returns. Likewise,
if; is harmful to the consumer's health prospect, we assume that
the harm will increase at an increasing rate. In both cases,6
R,1 >0
Definition 4.The factors x, and x, are said to be biased toward benefit if
R00 and toward harmfulness if RU0.
Notice from our definitions that two factors may be biased toward
benefit (harmfulness) regardless of the benefit or harm each one
may produce on its own. For example, two factors could be
benefit-biased even though each is classified as harmful, although
it is difficult to think of good examples.
As previously indicated, we suppose that there are three factors
that can directly affect the distribution function F, two of which are
the consumer's present outlays for consumption and prevention,
and the third being the general health environment that is beyond
the consumer's influence. The inclusion of the choice variables Z
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tand C1 as parameters in F is not standard and warrants further
elaboration. Since these effects turn out to be very similar, we
restrict our discussion here to the effect of Z on F.
Suppose that the individual has access to a set of future health
prospects wherein each prospect F€Sis a probability distribution
asspciated with an expenditure level Z. The mapping from Z tois,
however, not one-to-one. A person does not literally purchase a
health prospect. Rather, he buys a particular bundle or mix of
medical goods and services with a given sum of money. Since each
expenditure level may purchase several, perhaps many, mixes of
medical goods and services, there corresponds to each Z a whole set
of health prospectsStochastic dominance permits us to confine
our attention to the efficient set of prospects on the boundary
The concept asserts that for all risk-averse individuals a prospect G
is preferred to a prospect F if and only if G is larger than F, as
specified in Definition 1. Hence, we can assume that for a given Z
our consumer will always choose a mix of medical goods and
services that yields a dominant prospect as ordered by the rela-
Let Fe(h,Z') be the dominant (i.e., the largest) probability dis-
tribution corresponding to the expenditure level Z'. As shown in
Figure 1, if in the closed interval (O,h) the area
under the distribution function Fe(h,Z') is no greater than the area
under any other distribution function F(h,Z'). The connection
between R and Z is shown in Figure 2. For the expenditure level
Z',R(h,Z') is inversely related to the size of the distribution F(h,Z').
The region has an upper bound equal to 1, which reflects the worst
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FIGURE 2
prevent it. The lower bound R isthe locus of points represent-
ing the size of the dominant distribution for each and every
conceivable outlay on preventive medicine. It is reasonable to
assume that the efficiency frontierdecreases monotonically and
is convex, reflecting both the general benefits to future health
derived from larger outlays on preventive medicine and the di-
minishing marginal effectiveness of such activity.
RiskAversion
Whenan individual's utility function is represented by a von
Neumann-Morgensterri utility index with 4'(W) > 0, whereW
denotes his wealth, the individual is said to be globally risk averse
if <0 for all W. To measure the degree of risk averseness,




where,for small risks, RA is a function of the maximum sum, or
insurance premium, that the individual is willing to pay in order to
avoid a given risk. It is generally supposed that an increase in the
individual's wealth will reduce the maximum premium that he is
willing to pay; i.e.,
dWI
This proposition is widely known as the hypothesis of decreasing the probab
absolute risk aversion, fraudulent
In the temporal framework postulated in this paper, the individu-
al's utility function is represented by a von Neumann-Morgenstern Definition 6. 1
utility index u(C1,c2), where C1 and c2 denote present and future method of i
consumption, res.pectively, with C1 certain and c2 uncertain. With behavior ol
respect to future consumption, the individual is said to be risk the insurai
averse ifu22(C1,c2) <0. To measure the individual's aversion to risk, Pauly, 196k
Sandmo (1969) has suggested the temporal risk-aversion coefficient
The pres
u22(C1,c2) insurance A(C,,c2) =—
_________
u2(C,,c2)
moral haza: whereA(C1,c2) is also a function of the maximum premium that the insurance individual is willing to pay when faced with a given risk. Analogous present pa to the Arrow-Pratt hypothesis of decreasing absolute risk aversion, policy Sandmo proposed the following for the two-period case: and less pi
Prelimin
Definition 5.The individual's preferences are said to exhibit decreas- suggests se ing temporal risk aversion if' able to sup'
>0 andM (C ,,c2) concave fu:
0C1 t3c2 i.e.,
take many According to the principle of decreasing temporal risk aversion, (1) insurance the higher the individual's present consumption, the greater the would mak risk premium he is willing to pay in order to avoid a given gamble than in wo on future consumption, and (2) the higher his future consumption, the state o the lower will be the risk premium. Notice that. insurance
>0 implies that u122(C,,c2) <0
Conditior
and and




Inorder to take advantage of the law of large numbers, suppliers of These con
insurance must maintain safeguards so that the underlying stochas- Furthert
tic law is not undermined as a consequence of providing the inducing n
service. More specifically, the insurer must be certain that the act concave pa
and the manner of insuring persons against a hazardous event or we show t
misfortune does not increase the frequency of its occurrence or
amount of the claim. Often, the insured has the power to increase insurance
42
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consumption,
the probability of a hazardous event—either through deceptive or
fraudulent behavior or through legitimate means.7
Definition 6.Moral hazard refers to the phenomenon whereby the
method of insurance and the form of the insurance policy affect the
behavior of the insured and, therefore, the probabilities on which
the insurance company has relied (Arrow, 1971, Chs. 8 and 9;
Pauly, 1968).
The presence of moral hazard is a real cost in the production of
insurance protection and, hence, a genuine limit to its suppiy.
Completely apart from the opportunities for fraudulent behavior,
moral hazard arises in our problem because the consumer of health
insurance can affect his future health prospect by changing his
present pattern of consumption. If a change in the terms of the
policy (pI,x(h)I) causes the individual to purchase more insurance
and less prevention, we have a clear instance of "moral" hazard.
Preliminary inspection of the constraints in our model also
suggests several possible sources of moral hazard. It seems reason-
able to suppose that pre-insurance income is a monotone increasing
concave function of the health state reflecting diminishingreturns;
i.e., > 0 and <0. Of course, post-insurance income can
take many forms, depending on the payoffs x(h)l. Obviously, the
insurance company would try to avoid the sale of contracts that (1)
would make post-insurance income in better health states smaller
than in worse health states, and (2) would make any payments in
the state of perfect health. In order to avoid these pitfalls, the
insurance company must offer a payoff schedule satisfying
Condition 1.y2(h) +x'(h)I >0
and











These conditions imply a monotonic decreasing payoff schedule.
Furthermore, in order to increase the size of a policy without
inducing moral hazard, the insurance company will never choose a
concave payoff schedule. Abstracting from the use of deductibles,
we show that, given any concave schedule, there always exists a
non-concave schedule that will yield a greater revenue for the
insurance company. Let x(h) in Figure 3 be a concave payoff
43 Health Insurance and Preventive MedicineFIGURE 3 3. THE
schedule and let (l°,x(h)I°) be the largest insurance policy an
individual can buy without violating conditions 1 and 2. In order to
facilitate our analysis, let us construct a new curve, BA, where
BA =y2(i)—x(h)I°.If [I°,x(h)I°] is the maximum insurance policy
given x(h), then BA is tangent to OB at the point B. Now let
[I*,x*(h)I*1 be a policy with a linear payoff schedule x*(h), which is
actuarially equivalent to [I°,x(h)I°], and let BA* =Y2(I)—x*(h)I*.
Then it is evident that [l*,x*(h)I*] is not the largest policy that can
be sold under the restriction of conditions 1 and 2. The largest
linearpolicyis[I**,x*(h)I**],wherel** >1*,with
BA**Y2(')_x*(h)I**.Following the same reasoning, a payoff
schedule convex to the origin may improve the insurance com-
pany's revenue still further. In order to avoid violating conditions 1
and 2, however, the payoff schedule cannot be excessively convex.
In fact, the limiting BA curve for convex schedules is OB itself. This
result leads to a further restriction on the payoff schedule.
Condition 3. x"(h)0 and + x"(h)I <0
From these conditions we see that insurance companies must
steer a fine course between "the rock" of moral hazard and the
"whirlpool" of unattractive and unsalable policies. Ideally, cover-
age should be carefully tailored to the requirement of every client,
but the heterogeneity of the population and the cost of infonnation
place definite limitations on this approach. Various devices such as
coinsurance and deductibles are used, and though some work
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13. THE BASIC MODEL
Inthis section we present the model in which it is assumed that the
consumer maximizes a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility
with the probability distribution of the health index dependent
only on preventive medicine and the general health environment.
From equations (1)—(3) we see that the consumer's problem is to
choose 1 and Z so as to maximize8
(4) U(1,Z) =5 —p1 —Z,y2(h,a) +x(h,/3)1]dF(h;Z,y)
where Y1, a, p, /3, and 'y are parameters. The following assumptions
are imposed both to generate stability of equilibrium and to
produce some meaningful predictions concerning various
equilibrium displacements.
Assumption 1.The consumer's utility function is strictly concave, and
present and future consumption are noncompetitive; i.e.,
UwU22 <0and ri,20
Assumption 2.The consumer exhibits decreasing temporal risk aver-
sion; i.e.,
Assumption 3.Both pre-insurance and post-insurance future income
are increasing concave functions of the future health state; i.e.,
>0 <0, +x'(h)I >0 +x"(h)I <0, for
he(0,1)
Assumption 4.The insurance payoff schedule is a decreasing convex
function of the future health state; i.e.,
x'(h) <0 and x"(h) for he (0,1)
From Assumption 3, we also have
x"(h) <—
Assumption5.Expenditure for preventive medicine is beneficial to
future health, subject to diminishing returns; i.e.,<0and
>0. An increase in the riskiness of the general health environ-
ment reduces the size of the prospect; i.e., R,, >0,where y is a
risk-shift parameter.
HealthInsurance and Preventive Medicine
I
ancepolicy an
ad 2. In order to
rye, BA, where
nsurance policy
mt B. Now let
ex*(h), which is
_x*(h)1*.




























Suppose that an interior solution to the problem exists. Then the






Equations (5.1) and (5.2), respectively, supply the requirements for negative als
the optimal outlay on insurance and preventive medicine. The
optimal outlay on insurance equates the expected marginal utility
of present consumption with the expected marginal utility of future EquilibriumDi
consumption, the latter weighted by the insurance payoff schedule
and discounted by p. The optimal outlay on preventive medicine From (5), 1
equates the expected marginal utility of present consumption with Y1, a, p, f3, a
the gain in expected utility caused by an increment in spending on values of I a
preventive medicine. Notice that the consumer must believe that comparative
money spent for preventive medicine will have a positive influence guarantee ti
on his health prospect, no matter how small, otherwise he will also aid us
spend nothing on it. statics.
The implication of these first-order conditions can best be ap-
preciated by comparing them with their counterparts in a single- 1. A Change in]
period decision model. In the context of a single period, the optimal
insurance equalizes income in all states as long as the insurance is The optimal
actuarially fair. Moreover, in the special case in which prevention r
does not raise expected income, and barring moral hazard, a Li0
corollaryproposition is that demand for prevention will be zero (6.1)
because full insurance eliminates the pecuniary advantage other- I
wisepresent in shifting the probabilities of particular events. These
results do not obtain in the multiperiod model, however, for the (6 2) =
simplereason that both insurance and prevention have positive
opportunity costs in terms of present consumption. Thus, in general,
the optimal outlay for prevention will be positive and the optimal It is cony
insurance will be less than full coverage, of (6.1) and
The equilibrium derived from Equation (5) is stable if impact of a











can best be ap-






















is negative definite, where




Negative definiteness of D requires that U11,<0 and
> U,, <0 is guaranteed by Assumption 1. U2z <0 is
guaranteed by assumptions 1—6(seepropositions 2 and 3 in the
Appendix). In general, there is no a priori reason for signing U,z;
however, in this case, the conditions that guarantee U,, and
negative also makenegative.
EquilibriumDisplacements
From(5), 1 and Z can be expressed as functions of the parameters
Y,, a, p.and y. A shift in any one of them will change the optimal
values of I and Z. In this subsection we examine and interpret these
comparative static results. Notice that assumptions 1—6 not only
guarantee that D is negative definite and Ujz is negative,9 but they
also aid us in determining the signs of terms in the comparative
statics.
1. A Change in Present Income







Itis convenient to interpret the first term on the right-hand side
of (6.1) and (6.2) as the direct income effect; it would measure the
of a change in present income on the amount of insurance
47 HealthInsurance and Preventive Medicineand preventive medicine purchased in the event that insurance
and preventive medicine were independent alternatives; i.e., if
= = 0.The second term on the right-hand side of (6.1) and
(6.2) can then be called the indirect income effect; it measures the
influence of any interdependence. Given assumptions 1—6, Propo-
sition 2, and the stability requirement, the direct income effect on
both I and Z is positive and the indirect income effect is negative.
Of course, the total effect in each case is ambiguous, which is not
unusual for pure income effects. The iniportant implication is that
since insurance and preventive medicine are competitive options,
either one (perhaps both) could turn out to be inferior with respect
to a change in present income.
2. A Change in Future Income
It is convenient to assume that the shift parameter for future income
ôy2(h a) is nonstochastic and takes the fonn =a,where a >0. Then
ôa
the partial derivatives of I and Z with respect to a are:
[f1
— ] iizz(j1'u2dF





Asin the first case, the effect of a change in future income is
separable into two parts with definite but opposite signs. However,
the signs are now reversed. The first term on the right-hand side of
(7.1) and (7.2) is negative and the second is positive. The direct
income effect is now negative because, ignoring any cross effects,
an increase in future income makes the purchase of insurance and
preventive medicine less urgent. But the competitive nature of the
two services produces an offsetting positive response so that we
cannot definitely sign the total effect. In this case, if the direct
effect on insurance (preventive medicine) outweighs the indirect
effect, then insurance (preventive medicine) is inferior with respect
to a change in future income. Notice also, since insurance and
prevention are substitutes, the demand for either one (perhaps
both) could increase with a rise in future income.
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3. A Change in the Price of Insurance
From the individual's point of view, a variation in the price of
insurance can take two forms: (1) a change in the private per unit
cost p, and (2) a change in the payoff schedule x(h). These price
effects, however, are not symmetrical.
The displacement in the optimal values of 1 and Z with respect to
a change in p can be divided into two parts, a present income effect






As we have seen in 3.1 (p. 47), the signing of the income effect
depends on the relative magnitude of the direct and indirect terms.
The sign of the substitution effect, however, is definite: It is
negative in (8.1) and positive in (8.2). If insurance and prevention
are both "normal goods" with respect to present income—which
we feel is a very plausible assumption—then 01/Op <0; i.e., a fall in
the private cost of insurance will lead to an increase in demand for
it. However, the sign of OZIOp is ambiguous. If it is positive, then a
fall in the private cost of insurance will promote moral hazard.
Now assume that there is a change in the insurance payoff
schedule x(h). For simplicity, we suppose that the change is




where b >0. Then the displacements of I and Z with respect to a


















We see immediately that the first two terms are future income the change
effects. However, the expressions in the brackets are different from the first an
those in 3.2 in that the utility terms are weighted by the insurance direct and
payoffs. This difference does not change the signs of the direct and • terms, we
indirect income effects, but it may change the sign of the combined
effect. The remaining term in (9.1) and (9.2) is again the intertem- (Pta'—
poralsubstitution effect; it is positive for insurance and negative for
d prevention. What can be said of the total effects? Assuming that the an
direct income effect dominates in (8.1) and (8.2), then insurance
and prevention are both "inferior goods." Since in the case of °
insurance the substitution effect is positive, a proportional change By propos
in future insurance payoffs produces an ambiguous effect on the negative.
demand for insurance; O1/13f3> 0only if the substitution effect medicine
outweighs the combined income effect. Since in the case of combined
prevention the income and substitution effects are both negative, nitudes of
the proportional change in payoff produces a definite negative Previou
effect on the demand for preventive medicine. shown th
We emphasize in passing that although a change in p and a guarantee
proportional change in x(h) both produce income and substitution optimal ar
effects, in general they are not the same. The difference stems from our model
the fact that a change in p produces a combined present income preventioi
effect and a substitution effect involving present marginal utility, shows the
whereas the change in x(h) produces a combined future income the suffici




4. A Change in Risk
Suppose that there is an exogenous change in the riskiness of the
general health environment. Let a change in the parameter y 4 MODEL
generatea mean-preserving change in the spread of all health HEALTI-
prospects F€$ with the equality holding forh =1.
Then the effects of a change in y on the optimal levels of 1 and Z As we me
are: the only f
50





Notice that as in the case of income effects, it is possible to divide
the change in the optimal values of I and Z into two parts. We call
the first and the second terms of (10.1) and (10.2), respectively, the
direct and indirect risk effects. In order to sign these separate




By propositions 1 and 3 in the appendix, both coefficients are
negative. Thus, the direct effects for both insurance and preventive
medicine are positive and the indirect effects are negative. The
combined effects will, of course, depend on the relative mag-
nitudes of the separate terms.
Previous studies by Leland (1966) and Sandmo (1970) have
shown that decreasing temporal risk aversion is sufficient to
guarantee that an increase in risk will cause an increase in the
optimal amount of saving (in our case, insurance). But we see from
our model that the condition is more complex. First, by recognizing
prevention as an alternative hedge against uncertainty, our model
shows the existence of an indirect risk effect. Second, we find that
the sufficient condition for a positive risk effect involves restric-
tions on the class of payoff functions as well as on the class of utility
functions. An important implication of this latter finding is that the
insurance company has in its choice of payoff schedule a significant
weapon to combat moral hazard.
4.MODEL WITH CONSUMPTION AFFECTING
HEALTH PROSPECT
Aswe mentioned in the introduction, preventive medicine is not
the only factor that can influence the consumer's health prospect.
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ad of all health
ioldingforh =1.
levels of I and ZWe need not go so far as to say "you are what you consume," but it — 2
ishardly controversial to admit that many nonmedical goods and
V11_j0(p u
services—food, housing, drink, tobacco—can and often do have an
important bearing on future health, either positive or negative. In (13) =f u11d
this section we examine the consumer's optimal outlay on insur-
°
anceand prevention when present consumption, C1, is a parameter.
—v— ofFas well as a variable inn. In order to analyze what we believe to
—U—
bethe most interesting case, we make two additional assumptions:
Assumption 7.Changes in present consumption involve goods that are
harmful to health, subject to increasing negative returns; i.e., The first-o
>0, >0 consumptior
sumer will
Assumption 8.Preventive medicine and present consumption are expected ma
marginal uti biased toward benent, and risk and present consumption are biased




The consumer's expected utility can now be written as expected m
change in th
v =f'u(ci,c2)ciF(h;z,ci,y) in both Z a
0 canbest be
where u is again a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index with with those
continuous derivatives of the first, second, and third order. As in the and accordi
preceding section the consumer will choose I and Z so as to dF <
maximizeV subject to the constraints,
Li
C1= —Z Our interp:
c2(h) =y2(h) +x(h)I decrease if
sequently,
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is negative definite, where f'xu2dFc
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lonsume,"but it
goods and V,1 —2pxu12+x2u22)dF +2pf(pu1 —xu2)dFc1 +p'f
lien do have an
or negative. In (13) =f'uiidF +2f u1(dFc1
)utlay on insur-
(1
isa parameter 1 1
atwe believe to (pu11 —xu21)dF+f (pu1—xu2)(dFc,—
al assumptions:
e goods that are ÷ Pf'uldFci +p —
i.e.,
The first-order maximization conditions state that when current
consumption affects the future health prospect, then (1) the con-
sumer will choose an optimal insurance outlay by equating the
nsumption are expected marginal utility of present consumption with the expected
Dtion are biased marginal utility of future consumption discounted by p, net of the
change in the expected utility from a shift in the probability
distribution caused by a change in C1; and (2) he will choose an
optimal expenditure on preventive medicine by equating the
tten as expected marginal utility of present consumption with the net
change in the utility of the health prospect stemming from changes
in both Z and C1. The implications of these first-order conditions
can best be seen by comparing the equilibrium values of I and Z
ility index with with those derived in the preceding section. Given Assumption 7




Ourinterpretation is that the optimal present consumption will
decrease if it has a harmful effect on the health prospect.'° Con-
sequently, the optimal outlays I and Z as determined by Equation
(12) should be larger than those determined by Equation (5) in
Section 3, where C1 is assumed to have no effect whatsoever on the
health prospect.
The second-order maximization conditions specify that V11,
<0 and >We will show that assumptions 1—8 are
sufficient to make I and Z competitive. Notice first that by Assump-
tion 1,
f(pni—xu21)dF<0
Next, by propositions 2—5 in the appendix, we find that the terms
fxu2dFc1and
53 HealthInsurance and Preventive Medicineare positive, and the terms
loll 'xu andf'n (dFe1(.1—
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VIZ = V7,<0
Having examined the maximization conditions, let us now turn to
the comparative statics. As before, the equilibrium values off and Z
are determined by the parameters Y1, a, p, 13,andy. The consumer's
optimal expenditure on insurance and preventive medicine will
change whenever there is an exogenous change in any of these
parameters. Let the equilibrium values of I and Z be denoted by 1*
andZ*, and let F(h;C Symbolically,the comparative static
results are:
01* 01* [j(2pu1—xu2)dFr.1 +pf ]V77
(14) +
OY OI'1 F=F IAI
+
—[2f u dF(., VIZ
IA






























































in equations (6)—(1O) of the basic model. The difference is that V11,
and IA Iaresubstituted for U11, and ID ISinceand




must have the same signs as the corresponding terms in
andPreventive Medicine




in any of these









To simplify our notation, let
t =(ii,a, p, /3, y)





have the same general form as the terms
at atBut because the magnitudes vary, the corresponding total effects so that the
may be different. extended m
The remaining terms in equations (14)—(18) are new. They To summ
measure the effects of consumption-induced shifts in the health ence on futi
prospect on the optimal outlays for health insurance and preventive and prevent
medicine. Observe that each coefficient shown contains a first- or tions 7—8,t
second-order differential of F caused by the displacement of derived in
present consumption, C1. Notice also that most of the additional magnitudes
terms can be properly classified as supplementary income or risk
effects. The exception is Equation (16), in which there is also a
supplementary substitution effect. It may seem odd at first glance
that /3 does not generate an additional substitution term, but the
explanation is to be found in the fact that size of marginal loss 5.SUMMAR'
causedby consumption-induced harm to the future health prospect The proble
is proportional only to p, the private unit cost of insurance, insurance
The predictions on the additional terms are exactly parallel to uncertain f
those in the preceding section. The income and risk effects can be tally diffen
divided into separate direct and indirect terms of definite and transfers in
corresponding signs. Given assumptions 1—8,wefind that whereas th
1 health pros
f'ui.dFc, ,J"udFrici andf0udFvc1 principal e
earnings le
are negative and edge the p
f'udFe1and consumer i
are positive. Hence the separate supplemental terms are all signed, partitioned
but the combined effects are ambiguous. Again, the outcome in pure preve
preventive each case depends on the relative magnitudes of the opposing utility, and direct and indirect effects. The supplementary substitution terms in health pros Equation (16) are definitely signed, but they are opposite from
those in the basic model. However, the equilibrium conditions consumpti(
As is we require the sense o
'1 1 of probabil
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so that the signs of the combined substitution effects in the
extended model are the same as in the basic model.
To summarize, the presence of consumption as a harmful influ-
ence on future health will increase the optimal outlay on insurance
and prevention over what it would be otherwise. But given assump-
tions 7—8,thequalitative nature of the comparative static results
derived in the basic model remains unchanged, although the
magnitudes are likely to be different.
5.SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Theproblem studied in this paper is the optimal choice of health
insurance and preventive medicine for an individual faced with
uncertain future health. Insurance and prevention are fundamen-
tally different approaches to health planning in that the former
transfers income from the present to hazardous states in the future
whereas the latter alters present consumption to benefit future
health prospects. Our analysis is limited to the case in which the
principal effect of the state of health is on net income (current
earnings less necessary medical expenses), but we freely acknowl-
edge the potential importance of health as a direct influence on
consumer preferences.
In the basic model, we assume that current consumption can be
partitioned into three mutually exclusive categories: insurance,
pure prevention, and other consumption outlays. In this instance,
preventive activity is assumed to have no direct influence on
utility, and consumption is assumed free of any effects on future
health prospects. In the extended model, we include a category of
consumption in which the influence is mixed.
As is well known, the expected utility model is very general in
the sense of admitting a wide range of risk attitudes and a broad set
of probability distributions. In the context of optimal insurance and
prevention, it is plausible to suppose that we are dealing with a
generally risk-averse population and a set of prospects ordered by
stochastic dominance. A few additional and, we hope, quite reason-
able assumptions enable us to guarantee stability of equilibrium
and to derive several meaningful results.
An important finding is that insurance and prevention are strictly
competitive (net substitutes). This result has immediate implica-
tions for equilibrium displacements caused by changes in wealth,
the amount of uncertainty in the environment, and the price of
57 Health Insurance and Preventive Medicineinsurance. Total income effects turn out to be ambiguous, but we is not outwei
can definitely sign separate direct and indirect effects. If, as is words, our m
likely, the direct effects outweigh the indirect effects, the corn- a decline in
bined effects are also signed: The demand for insurance and acts as a che
prevention will vary directly with present income and inversely for preventi
with future income. Likewise, there are separate direct and indirect hazard depe
risk effects; again, if the direct effect is dominant, we predict that effects. As
the demand for insurance and prevention will vary directly with the typically cli
greater riskiness of the health environment. In addition to income low-income
effects, changes in the price of insurance yield definite substitution cant.t' In ca
effects: A fall in the price of insurance (in the form of either a subsidy to fi
decline in the premium or a rise in benefits) will increase the amount moral hazar
of insurance and decrease the outlay on prevention. If the substitution
sign relationship between the combined income effect and the must be qu
substitution effect produces a fall in the price of insurance and scope of the
causes the individual to increase the optimal outlay .on insurance of a state-in
and to decrease the optimal outlay on prevention, then we have a insurance a:
clear case of moral hazard. problem of
There are further implications in this study concerning the
phenomenon of moral hazard. The insurance company has within
its control a device—the selection of a payoff schedule (together
with deductibles and coinsurance)—to prevent moral hazard. The
desired schedule must avoid any coverage that will cause post- APPENDIX
insuranceincome to rise with greater misfortune or to increase at an Proposition 1.
increasing rate with an improved health state. A schedule with spread of F
these characteristics can produce a bias toward insurance and
against prevention and, hence, promote moral hazard. Lu1—xv
Thecompetitive character of insurance and prevention poses a F' rthermor problem in designing an efficient national health insurance pro-
U
gram. Our analysis suggests that efforts to extend the coverage of dF <
health insurance through public subsidy should be weighed against Jo
'
thecost arising from possible reductions in the demand for preven- proof.Integrat
tion. Although we know of no way to avoid this opportunity cost
altogether, it can and undoubtedly should be minimized. We see
herethat the terms of insurance potentially provide an important
instrument of control. For example, if the price of insurance is
reduced by a public subsidy to stimulate demand, there may be
important differences in the way people respond, depending on
whether the subsidy (1) reduces the current expenditure or (2)
increases the future payoffs. In case (1), we would predict an
(i) — (h,
increase in the volume of insurance because both the income and
the substitution effects are likely to be negative. Moral hazard is follows fro
indicated if the negative income effect on preventive expenditure preserving












































is not outweighed by the positive cross-substitution effect. In other
words, our model demonstrates that the income effect generated by
a decline in the proportion of the premium paid by the beneficiary
acts as a check on the tendency to substitute insurance protection
for prevention. Of course, the importance of this restraint on moral
hazard depends on the relative size of the income and substitution
effects. As medical expenses and related costs of health care
typically claim a significant share of budgets of middle- and
low-income receivers, income effects are also likely to be signifi-
cant.'1 In case (2), when the price reduction takes the form of a
subsidy to future payoffs, the situation is reversed. The problem of
moral hazard is now inescapable since both the income and
substitution effects are negative. Any such implications, of course,
must be qualified by possible limitations in the nature and the
scope of the model. In particular, we recognize that the assumption
of a state-independent utility function does bias our result toward
insurance and against prevention, which tends to exaggerate the
problem of moral hazard.
APPENDIX
Proposition1.Let the shift in y be a mean preserving increase in the
spread ofF. Given assumptions 1—4, then
Furthermore,
and
Proof.Integrating by parts twice, we obtain
(u,2
+x'I)
follows from the assumption that the shift in y represents a mean
preserving increase in spread.
59 Health Insurance and Preventive Medicine(ii) (ti,22—xu222)(y4+xi)2<0
follows from A.2.
(iii) (u,2 —xu 22)+x'7) <0
followsfrom A.1 and A.3.
(iv)
followfrom A.3 and A.4. Therefore,
—xu2)dF.,, <0










Proposition 2.Let the factor Z be beneficial to the consumer's health












(i) — — +x'I)—x'u2]Rz(h,Z,'y)
I
= — [(u,2—xu22)(y2' +xi)—x'u2]Rz(1,Z,y)
followsfrom the fact that(0,Z,y) =0.
(ii) (1,Z, y) <0 follows from the assumption thatZ is beneficial to the
consumer's health prospect. (u,2 —xu22)(y, + x 'I) >0follows from
A. 1 and A.3, and x 'u2 <0 follows from A.4. Therefore,
>0.






























canbe shown with the same reasons given in Proposition 1.
(iv)Similarly, it can be shown that
fu2dFz <0





(a) Integrating by parts twice, we obtain
5 = — +x
I
+f'[u22+x'I)2+
onsumer s health o
(i)Fzz(h,Z,y)dliforh =0,1. Therefore,
''Y0=0
(ii) —u2+ xi) (h,Z,y)
I= — u2 + (1,Z,y) <0
follows from A.3 and A.5.
(iii)5 +x'l)2+ + <0
,Z,y)'
followsfrom A.1, A.4, and A.5.
(b) Integrating by parts twice, we obtain
)dh +x'I)2
Again, we see that
regardless of the changes in y and Z. By assumption 6, R 0. The
s beneficial to the hypothesis of the proposition thus guarantees
> 0 follows from 1
ore,
which is what we wish to prove.
















(i) (0,Z,C1,y) =0,and by A.7 R(.1 (l,Z,C1,y) >0. Following Ad IudF. and A.3, therefore, j0
+x'I)Rc1(h,Z,C1,y)!l>0 and
(ii)A.1—4 and A.7 also imply that
5
f'[u12(y +x"J)+u122(y2 +x'l)JR.dh <0 except that
Therefore,
f'uIdF(l <0
NOTES (b)Following a similar reasoning, we obtain (b) and (c).
1.Consider
















(a) Integrating by parts twice, we obtain also inclu
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+101 +x'1)2 +u2(y
(i)Again, R7c1 (O,Z,C1,y) =0,and by assumption 8, (1,Z,C1,y)
> 0. A.3 therefore guarantees the result
112(Y2 <0
(ii)In addition, A.l, A.4, and A.8 guarantee








exceptthat A.8 refers to > 0 and <0, respectively.
NOTES
and(c).
1.Considerable doubt, however, exists in the medical profession regarding the
effectiveness of preventive medicine, especially that part concerned with the
early detection and treatment of diseases. If preventive medicine is of doubtful
value, then why would a rational person purchase any of it? We have no
particular ax to grind on this issue except to point out that preventive medicine
need not be so narrowly conceived: it might just as well include any consump-
tion activity, medical or otherwise, having a potential benefit on future health.
Moreover, the crucial consideration in our model is the individual's subjective
view of the effectiveness of prevention, the opinions of medical experts to the
contrary notwithstanding.
2.Prevention is sometimes characterized as an activity that reduces the prob-
abilities of hazardous states of health. Although this description is correct, it is
not the whole story because it is silent on what happens to the probabilities of
less hazardous states, including those that are totally free of hazard. As the
hypothesis of risk avoidance strongly suggests, prevention is not confined to
activities that uniformly "roll up" probabilities toward less hazardous states; it
also includes those that reduce the frequencies of both the most and the least
63 Health Insurance and PreventiveMedicinehazardous states but leave the average state of health unaffected. To cite an
6.Feldstein example: A drug or operation that reduces the chances of a person's becoming
very ill may also involve side effects that lower the chances of one's being of!
7.Frech, H extremely well. A risk-averse person might favor such a prospect even though it
Mo does not offer much hope of raising his health expectation.
8.Grossmar
3.For analyses based on conditional expected utility, see Arrow (1973), Nordquist mv (1970), and Parkin and Wu (1972).
9.
4.Future income, L's,is assumed to be net of (a) anticipated future medical Ma expenses, and (b) reductions in earning power caused by illness. We assume
that the individual can purchase insurance to compensate for both sources of
loss to future consumption opportunities.
IOU
11.Hadar,J.,
5.In their seminal paper, Ehrlich and Becker (1972) provide a similar analysis in of a setting of a single period and two states. 12.Hirshleif
6.We recognize that some factors may be beneficial in some range of consump- Sta tion and harmful in others.
7.The principal objective of this paper is to develop a rigorous formulation of the 13. joint demand for insurance and prevention. Thus, we adhere to the conven-
Sa tional atomistic specification of consumer choice and decline to make the 14.Luce, D., market price of insurance depend directly on any of the individual's choice
(M variables, as is done in the article by Ehrlich and Becker (1972, p. 640). 15.Mossin,, Although it is quite likely that a monopolistic supplier of insurance would Ec perceive and be concerned about the presence of moral hazard, we argue that
16.Nordquis the same will not be true of the small and independent purchaser. ce
8.Properly specified, the problem should include the further restriction f Th
whereis the premium of the largest insurance policy (with payoff x(h)I) that
17.Parkin, J the consumer is allowed to purchase. For simplicity, we assume that this 01 inequality constraint is never binding.
pp 9. We should add the reminder that the conditions cited here are sufficient but not 18.Pauly, I
necessary to sign the separate income terms. Ec
10.If a change in present consumption involves goods that are beneficial to health,
19.
theseresults will be reversed. (A
11.For other possible checks to moral hazard, see Arrow (1971, Ch. 8) and Ehrlich 20.
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COMMENTS
Robert L. Berg, M.D.
University of Rochester
Sherwin
The influence that variable insurance coverage has on the purchase of University of Rochester
preventive services represents a particularly thorny issue in the health care
field. In general, we can expect that the consumer will choose such a mix as to
maximize his expected utilities.In an open-market situation, in which the This is a very
individual chooses his expenditures, then there is a real possibility that he self-protection:
might underspend on prevention; that is, he might underspend if preventive with known heal
services represent a separate good such that the purchase of curative by self-protecti
services does not entail the purchase of preventive services. With perfect medicine) shifts
information he should be expected to choose an optimal mix of insurance and doesn't change
prevention to maximize utility. However, information is imperfect, especially long as preven
in the health field. Prevention has been oversold as an idea in many areas, function of pooi
except that only some consumers overbuy, such as in purchasing annual expenditures in
physical exams. Prevention makes a big difference if it leads more people to practical import
wear seat belts or stop smoking cigarettes, but behavioral modification has depends on the
been the least successful approach to prevention. Much must be done in which there is Ii
educating the public in any system of health care, but the transmission of Nordquist am
information alone does not insure compliance with the optimal program. affect only inco
There is also a considerable problem of moral hazard. It is not so much that suffering," whic
the consumer will run great health risks because health care costs are going and market ins
to be paid with full entitlement or increased entitlement and thus would tend to and sufferings,
avoid obtaining necessary preventive services, but that full entitlement will effects involves
lead to unnecessary hospitalization and unnecessarily long hospitalization perhaps that is
with overly expensive work-ups. Another mail
Another teature is unnecessary office visits. But who is to define unneces- Nordquist and
sary office visits? When initiated by a patient, an office visit represents de preventive
facto demand. dollar of covera
Although all this is true from the point of view of the consumer, the program This could be
must face tradeoffs between curative and preventive medicine. Fees will are sufficiently
presumably be replaced by capitation payments. In this circumstance, who classify individ
should determine the contents of the preventive package when the public is of degree, and
so poorly informed? Somebody must accept the responsibility for maximizing productivity of
societal utilities, and this is difficult to do without knowledge of the value companies do
society attaches to the outcomes of medical care. Much additional research is is evidence tha
needed on health status indexes and the societal values placed on the expenditure pr
conditions of life to provide a basis for such judgments. But whateve
Whatever the decision, it may be difficult to keep preventive services within cannot be true
reasonable bounds. With a few crucial exceptions (e.g., the control of as the authors i
hypertension to prevent strokes, and immunizations to prevent certain infec- some exogeno
tious diseases), prevention is of little use at the present time, regrettably, and
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we tend to overdo it. On net, the consumer will have little to say about the mix
of preventive and curative services, and even when preventive services
become more effective, he may well resist diverting money to preventive
services ifit means longer queues and personal inconvenience.
Sherwin Rosen
University of Rochester
This is a very careful and competent investigation of the economics of
self-protection. The authors consider a two-period model in which individuals
with known health states in the first period reduce second-period medical risk
by self-protection and market insurance. Self-protection(i.e.,preventive
medicine) shifts the actual distribution of risky outcomes. Market insurance
doesn't change the distribution, but transfers the risks to others, at a price. As
long as preventive expenditures shift the cumulative probability density
function of poor health states, they are productive; and individuals extend
expenditures in both directions up to the appropriate margins. Of course, the
practical importance of self-protection for the allocation of health resources
depends on the extent to which it does in fact shift medical risks, a point on
which there is little evidence one way or the other.
Nordquist and Wu specialize their argument to a case wherein health states
affect only income and not the capacity to consume: They ignore "pain and
suffering," which otherwise introduces asymmetry between self-protection
and market insurance. Market insurance reduces financial risks but not pain
and sufferings, whereas self-protection affects both. Inclusion of health-utility
effects involves conceptually straightforward extensions of their methods and
perhaps that is sufficient justification for ignoring them at this stage.
Another maintained assumption strikes me as having less justification.
Nordquist and Wu assume that the price of market insurance is independent
of preventive expenditures. That is, they assume that insurance premiums per
dollar of coverage are independent of medical risks individuals choose to run.
This could be a valid assumption at the individual level if transactions costs
are sufficiently high, for then insurance companies do not find it worthwhile to
classify individuals according to risk. But even those factors must be a matter
of degree, and the empirical validity of the assumption surely depends on the
productivity of preventive expenditures. The observation that insurance
companies do not vary premiums across individuals in different risk classes
is evidence that policing and information costs are large relative to preventive
expenditure productivity on health.
But whatever is the true assumption for any person at random, it surely
cannot be true for the market as a whole or for the "representative" individual,
as the authors implicitly recognize in discussing moral hazard. Suppose that
some exogenous event, such as those considered in the paper, induces all
67 Health Insurance and Preventive Medicineindividuals to change self-protection expenditures and thereby to change the
average health state among all persons. Insurance companies now experi-
ence unanticipated changes in profit, and price competition and new entry
must alter premium rates. This sets off another chain, with feedbacks to
optimal self-protection expenditures, and so on. All these secondary and
higher-order effects are ignored in the paper and how they affect the
conclusions is not very obvious. For example, the process depicted above
may not be stable. But assuming that it was, some information on the long-run,
steady-state response could be obtained if the authors had considered the
other polar extreme in which insurance premiums and health state prob-
abilities are perceived to be related to each other rather than completely
unrelated.
Some other limitations of the specification should be mentioned.
1.Nordquist and Wu use an index, h, as a health state indicator. What is
the operational content of h and precisely what does it measure? Even
if health states could be ranked according to an objective univariate
index, it still must be an ordinal index. The authors arbitrarily normalize
the index to lie between zero and 1, but any monotonic transformation
would do just as well. It so, what sense does it make to talk about the
convexity of the insurance payoff schedule?
2.As pointed out above, the authors focus only on financial risks of
illness. Income (in period two) is what it would have been in the
absence of illness minus the cost of medical treatment. Income
received from the insurance company in the event of illness, xl, covers
some fraction of the medical bill. Thus they assume that illness does
not affect earning capacity and, more important, each illnessis
associated with a unique exogenously determined remedy available to
all at a fixed fee. All the much discussed effects of insurance and
payments by third parties on the type and quality of care are ignored.
Moreover, the quality of care and self-protection may be good substi-
tutes.
Turn now to the theorems established by the authors. For ease of interpreta-
tion and exposition, their argument will be simplified by considering a
one-period problem and collapsing the continuous distribution of possible
health states into a familiar binomial process. Although these simplifications
ignore some of the elegant technical sophistication of their model, they retain
its spirit and, Ibelieve, help pinpoint the intuitive economic content of the
analysis.
Consider a one-period problem in which the individual chooses preventive
expenditures Z and insurance / to maximize
(1) Eu=(1 —p)u(Y0—p!—Z)+pu(Y1+xI)
In this formulation u() is the utility function (assuming risk aversion), p is the
probability of a "standard" illness, Y0 is income if illness doesn't occur, Y1 is
net income if illness does occur [(Y0 — Y1) is the medical billi, p is the price of
insurance, and xlis the amount of medical bills paid by the insurance
company. Assume that p is a function of preventive expenditure, p (Z), with
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whereis shorthand for marginal utility evaluated at the appropriate value of
non-illness net income and uis marginal utility evaluated at the appropriate
value of illness net income, and similarly for u0 and u1.
Just as in Nordquist and Wu's more sophisticated model, the content of this
theory is obtained by differentiating the marginal conditions with respect to
exogenous parameters and exploiting second-order conditions, as usual. A
geometrical interpretation can be given in the present case by using the
indirect utility function. We want to derive indifference curves between Z and
p conditional on the individual's buying the optimum amount of insurance
coverage at every value of p. Condition (2) above defines the optimum amount
of insurance for all values ofp. If the functional form of u were given, (2) could
be solved tori in terms of p, Z, and the other variables and substituted into (1),
resulting in a synthetic, indirect utility function relating Eu top, Z, Y0, Y1, p. and
x. Values of I are "optimized out" as it were, If a specific functional form is not
given, the indirect utility function is defined only implicitly by equations (1)
and (2). In other words, ignore (3) for the moment and treat (1) and (2) as two
equations in which I and Z are considered to be dependent variables and p,
Eu, x,p, Y1 and Y0 are considered to be independent variables. Then the
function Z(p,Eu,.. .)implicitly defined by (1) and (2) yields a family of
indifference curves between Zand p at alternative values of Eu.1 In distinction
to the usual case, the entire indifference map relating Z and p shifts when x, p,
Y1, and Y0 change, because in each case the optimum amount of insurance
changes.
The implicit function theorem applied to (1) and (2) establishes all the
essential properties of Z (p,Eu,.
..). In particular it readily shows that ÔZRIEu,
ÔZ/ôp, and ô2Zfôp2 are all negative. Therefore, the indifference curves ap-
pearasE0,E1, andE2in Figure 1. SinceZ andp are "bads," itshould comeas no
surprise that the indifference curves are concave and expected utility rises as
we move toward the origin. The constraint relating preventive medical expendi-
ture and the probability of illness is shown in Figure 1 as the curve labeled
p(Z). Hence the optimum amount of self-protection and resulting probability of
illness occur as usual at a point of tangency between an indifference curve
and the constraint. Since t3ZIOp = —(u0 —u1)I(1 along an indifference
curve, the geometry.and Condition (3) are internally consistent.
Think of the slope of an indifference curve, —OZ(p,Eu,. ..)Iôp, as a
reservation price. It is the (incremental) amount the individual is willing to pay
to reduce medical risk by a small amount. The theory of utility maximization
and risk aversion places no restrictions on how reservation prices vary with
the level of welfare, Eu (i.e., the derivative t92ZIôpe9Eu is unsigned and could
be either positive or negative). This is the fundamental reason why Nordquist
and Wu get so few positive predictions from their theory. Income effects
resulting from parameter changes can go in either direction, and even if
69 Health Insurance and Preventive Medicinesubstitution effects are unambiguous, the total, uncompensated effects are
not. Thus, to get unambiguous predictions itis necessary to make a priori
assumptions about the sign of income effects. To capture the essence of their
crucial assumptions in the present simplified model, assume that the margi-
nal reservation price of medical risk falls with real income. Then the slopes of
the indifference curves in Figure1 become steeper as we move up any
vertical line.I find it difficult to say whether such an assumption is "reasona-
ble" or not. Perhaps it is equally plausible to assume that the amount a person
will pay to reduce medical risk increases with wealth instead of decreasing.
Here would seem to be a case where ignoring pain and suffering might
make a difference. Whatever, let us examine the implications of this kind of
assumption.
Suppose that the price of insurance, p, decreases. Repeated application of
the implicit function theorem to the definitionof the indifference map
(equations (1) and (2)) has two implications. First, the entire indifference map
shifts up (ÔZ (p,Eu,. . .)IOp is negative) and the individual is unambiguously
better off at the new equilibrium. Second, the new indifference curves are not
so sharply inclined as the old ones were (&2ZIt9p op isnegative): The
compensated marginal offer price-risk schedu/e for reductions in medical risk
shifts downward. Now without some a priori specification of the income effect,
the net outcome in the new situation could involve either more or less risk than
the old one. However, if reservation prices fall with increases in Eu, the new
equilibrium must be at a point on p (Z) such as B. Preventive expenditure falls,
real risks rise, and there is a clear case of moral hazard.
Consider next an increase in x, the share of medical remedy costs
reimbursed by market insurance. Again the indifference curves shift upward
and the individual must be better off at the new equilibrium. But in this case it
turns out that the simple theory does not provide an unambiguous prediction
about what happens to the reservation price (i.e., O2ZIOp Ox is unsigned).
There is only a presumption that the indifference map tilts in the same way as
it did for the above case of a decrease in p. If it does, we get the same kind of
outcome; a move to the new equilibrium at a point such asB, a decrease inZ,
and an increase in p and moral hazard.
This simple theory by itself is silent about both income and substitution
effects for changes inx, whereas for changes in p itdoes make •an
unambiguous prediction about substitution effects, but of course not about
income effects.2 Nordquist and Wu get .a similar result in their more sophisti-
cated model, except that the substitution effectis definitely signed for
changes in x but not for changes in p (see their equations (8.2) and (9.2)).
Finally, consider a change in the risk-expenditure constraint p (Z). In fact,
suppose that p (Z) simply shifts to the left in Figure 1 without changing its
slope, a pure income effect, owing, for example, to an increase in public
health. In this case we get a very puzzling result if the same income effect
assumption as above is maintained: As long as the new equilibrium is interior,
preventive care falls and real risks rise. Of course, it is possible that the shift
in p (Z) is so large that the new equilibrium occurs along the p axis, in which
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Issible that the shift
thep axis, in which
rginal changes, the
above assumption about income effects implies that slight improvements in
public health induce individuals to expose themselves to greater risks. There
illness after the improvement than before' This outcome does not
appear very "reasonable" to me at all, but then again it is only a product of
the assumption and not necessarily an implication of the pure theory.3
In sum, the theory presented by Nordquist and Wu contains very few
empirical predictions. Given the technical sophistication of their model, it
seems doubtful whether further theorizing will result in a more authoritative
theory. Clearly, here is a case in which careful empirical study is the next
order of business. This theory is useful for organizing the structural relations
to be estimated from data and for clarifying thought. But it does not give
much guidance in advance about what these relationships should look like.
NOTES
1.Alternatively, p and! can be treated as "dependent" and Z, Eu, x, p, Y,, and V2 as "independent"
variables, yielding a function p(Z, Eu ).Of course, p(Z; .
..)is simply the inverse of
Z(p;. ..) and contains the same information about the indifference map.
2.To keep within the spirit of Nordquist and Wus model, notice that Z is not subtracted from Y, + xl
in Equation (1). In the context of a straight one-period model, it makes some sense forZ to be
subtracted from income in both states. The conceptual basis of the diagrammatic exposition in
Figure 1is unchanged in that case, but my cursory examination of it shows analysis is much
more difficult: It is not even clear that the indifference curves can be shown to be concave. If so,
then not even many of the pure substitution effects can be signed.
3.Improvements in public health must change insurance premiums and affect the result.I have
ignored these general equilibrium repercussions because Nordquist and Wu ignored them.
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